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1. Introduction 
 
In his book Cultural Identity and Political Ethics, Paul Gilbert discusses the 
case of Faiza Silmi, a Moroccan woman who lives in France with her husband 
and four children, all of who are French citizens. When Ms. Silmi applied for 
French citizenship herself, the Conseil d‟Etat refused her application on the 
grounds that her religious practice – wearing a burqua – is against the 
“essential values of French community” and is incompatible with a French 
cultural identity. Gilbert uses this case as starting point in his analysis “of the 
relationship between the body and cultural identity that it encapsulates” 
(Gilbert, 2010:96), but I want to use it as an illustration of Gilbert‟s approach 
to the problem of cultural identity. Unlike most contemporary critics of the 
politics of identity and multiculturalism, Gilbert doesn‟t concentrate solely on 
those cases where minorities make controversial claims by invoking their 
cultural identity, but shows that call for the protection of such identity, as in 
the case of Madam Silmi, can come from majority as well. Both sides can play 
the political game of invoking cultural identity and it is, Gilbert believes, a 
dangerous game. Gilbert main concern is the philosophical coherence of the 
very idea of cultural identity and how that idea translates into political 
realm. His goal is to “to scrutinize the foundations of a politics of cultural 
identity” (ibid., 13). Here again his approach differs from that of other 
political theorists critical of multicultural project who usually launch their 
attack on this project from a specific - liberal, republican, feminist, etc. – 
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position. Gilbert‟s book strives to “join the assault on the politics of cultural 
identity, but to do so without espousing any of the various theoretical 
positions – liberalism in some form, cosmopolitanism or whatever – from 
which it is generally launched” (ibid., 13).  
The aim of this paper is to explore the concept of cultural identity as it is 
invoked in contemporary political discourse. Is cultural identity a coherent 
concept? Do claims of preservation of cultures rest on solid philosophical 
grounds? How can we determine which claims of cultural identity are valid 
and which are not? Or is the case that the concept of cultural identity is so 
vague that we should abandon it altogether? I will try to answer these 
questions by engaging into a polemic with Paul Gilbert arguments presented 
in his book Cultural Identity and Political Ethics. The advantage of this book, 
as mentioned before, is that addresses the issue of cultural identity on its own 
merit without invoking any particular ideological framework. Therefore, it 
offers a good starting point from which to address these questions.  
Gilbert‟s criticism of the politics of identity rests on two main arguments. 
First one questions the assumption that members of cultural groups actually 
share “cultural features” that “can be collected together in such a way as to 
characterise its participant‟ whole way of life… so that one culture can be 
distinguished globally from another as picking out a distinct way of living” 
(ibid., 3). It is clear what we mean when we talk about person‟s individual 
cultural identity as “her linguistic and literary background, her religious and 
moral education and choices, her socially acquired attitudes and manners” 
(ibid., 2). This type of identity is most often “unique to its possessor” (ibid., 
3) because it represents a certain hybrid of different cultural influences a 
person has acquired through her life. It is much less clear what we mean when 
we talk about a group‟s collective cultural identity. For us to be able to 
coherently talk about collective identity of a group it is not enough to point 
out some cultural feature shared by the members of that group, we need to 
explain how sharing certain feature constitutes a community. Gilbert‟s 
argument is that this move is, more often the not, deeply problematic.  
There are two reasons for this. First, if we test some of the features given 
as an example of glue that holds the specific cultural groups together - Gilbert 
gives examples of language, shared values or shared history – it turns out that 
either this feature is shared with some who are not recognized as members of 
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that specific cultural group or that not all members of cultural group in 
question share that feature. That means that features put forward when 
arguing for cultural preservation of group‟s collective identity are either to 
wide (they do not exclude members of other groups) or to narrow (they do not 
cover all the members of that group). This, of course, means that listing 
cultural features as proof of unique collective markers that distinguish 
members of one groups from members of other groups will be unconvincing. 
Second, even in cases where there is a cultural feature that allows us to 
identify all the members of a specific group and exclude those who are outside 
that group, it does not follow that such a cultural group “should… necessarily 
be thought of as a community” (ibid., 4). Invoking community, Gilbert points 
out, presupposes “a group of people actually leading a common life”, but a 
cultural group “in circumstances in which they find themselves they may not 
have the sort of interactions between themselves that are needed for this, 
while in fact having just such interactions with members of other groups” 
which suggest that “if there is any community they are part of, then it is a 
multicultural one” (ibid., 5). This point often gets lost in debates on 
multiculturalism when the preservation of group identity is falsely equated 
with the preservation of a community.  
Gilbert‟s second argument is that one‟s collective cultural identity is not 
necessarily a deep one, but is often nothing more then surface identity. By this 
he means that certain feature offered as an essential part of person‟s cultural 
identity does not play an important part in determining that person‟s 
behavior or rationality of her actions, but its main purpose is to help that 
person to differentiate himself from those not considered to be members of her 
group. “Since it is”, Gilbert argues, “only to the extent to which some 
psychological feature of person‟s identity goes deep with her that there is 
taken to be a duty to recognize it in one‟s dealings with her, so a cultural 
identity must be theorized as something deep for the ethical demand to carry 
over to it” (ibid., 59). Claims of preservation of cultural identity in the 
political realm make sense only if they have a certain moral weight and that 
assumes that we are talking about deep and not surface identity.  
Gilbert maintains that pointing out these two elements – the distinction 
between individual and collective identity on one hand and between deep and 
surface identity on the other - when discussing the philosophical coherence of 
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the notion of collective identity is not arbitrary because “it matches… the 
use made of the notion by those who invoke it in support of various political 
claims” (ibid., 4). His main argument is that political claims based on cultural 
identity have no validity because they rest on a misconceived understanding 
of what cultural identity is and what it entails. I will argue that Gilbert‟s 
position is compelling, but that it is limited only to some and not to all 
political claims that invoke cultural identity. More specifically: the claims 
that rest on an essentialist, comprehensive and deep understanding of cultural 
identity are open to Gilbert‟s attack. Those claims, however, that invoke a 
constructivist and more dynamic understanding of cultural identity are, I 
believe, immune to Gilbert‟s criticism. 
 
 
2. Limits of Gilbert’s approach 
 
Gilbert‟s two core arguments have a limited reach: they point out only the 
limits of Herderian understanding of cultural identity. By Herderian I mean 
those theories that rest on following presuppositions on the nature of culture 
and its relationship to one‟s personal identity:  
1) Comprehensive nature of culture. Person‟s cultural identity is, as Gilberts 
puts it, “taken to be fairly all embracing” (ibid., 4) and determines, if not all, 
then most of important aspects of that persons‟ life. Therefore, to understand 
person‟s actions and justification his gives for those actions, it is necessary to 
understanding the culture she belongs to.  
2) Culture as given. Our cultural identity is something we are, rather then 
something we can choose to be. As individuals we are determined by a long 
tradition of culture we belong to. That does not mean this tradition has to be 
static and can never be put to question, but this process itself is determined 
by tradition and does not allow us, without completely leaving the framework 
of our culture, to arbitrarily choose who we want to be.  
 3) Authenticity of culture. If we do not follow the ways of our culture, we are 
living inauthentic existence and can not truly flourish and develop as persons. 
Because the rationality of actions is determined by belief system endorsed by 
our cultural group, the loss of one‟s cultural identity results in loss of 
coherence of one‟s actions.  
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4) Mosaic nature of cultures. Seyla Benhabib talks about „mosaic‟ model of 
culture as a view that „cultures are clearly delineated and identifiable entities 
that coexist, while maintaining firm boundaries‟ (Benhabib, 2002: 8). 
Therefore, cultures and members of these cultural groups are easily 
distinguishable between each other.  
5) Holistic nature of cultures. Cultures show a very high level of unity on issues 
of basic beliefs and values, as well as sharing those cultural features – such as 
language or shared history – that both unite them with all the members of 
their own group and differentiate them from members of other groups.  
6) Cultures as closed frameworks. Cultural traditions or specific elements of 
these traditions should only be question, changed, reformulated or abandoned 
from within and never from without. If every cultural group is a closed unit 
relying on its own tradition and its own notions of rational and reasonable 
behavior, then any sort of imposition from outside that group represents 
cultural imperialism.  
Herderian model is valid only if we accept that person‟s individual 
cultural identity is identical to collective identity of his cultural group, that 
cultural groups are always identical to communities, that cultural identity is 
always more then just a surface identity and that central cultural features of 
a specific group are both unique to that group and shared by all of its 
members. Otherwise it is impossible to maintain any of the six 
presuppositions listed above. The strength of Gilbert‟s criticism rests on 
putting into question each of these suppositions and in this way exposing the 
Herderian model as philosophically unintelligible. However, it is worth noting 
that Herderian model of understanding cultural identity is not the only game 
in town. There is, at least, one more way one can approach the idea of 
cultural identity. In her book Claims of Culture Benhabib points out the 
difference between essentialist approach (what I call Herderian approach) and 
a constructivist approach that sees cultures as “constant creations, recreations 
and negotiations of imaginary boundaries between „we‟ and „us‟” (ibid.). If we 
look at case of Ms. Simli through constructivist, rather than Herderain lens, 
the central question is not if wearing a burqua is against essential values of 
French community or not, but whether the representatives of French 
community (in this case Conseil d‟Etat) should define what it means to be 
French through rejection of burqua. This constructivist approach, I want to 
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argue, is immune to Gilbert‟s line of attack and, therefore, offers a possibility 
of invoking cultural identity claims in the political discourse in a coherent 
and a meaningful way. If we assume that collective cultural identity is 
something that is primarily constructed rather then given, issues of individual 
vs. collective cultural identity, cultural groups vs. community, deep vs. 
surface identity or comprehensiveness of group‟s cultural features fade in 
relevance.  
These two different approaches to the idea of cultural identity – 
Herderian and constructivist - invoke different notions of recognition. 
Patchen Markell in his book Bound by Recognition talks about two such types 
of recognition. First one is cognitive recognition that appears when we are 
recognizing and evaluating something that is already existent. Markell gives 
an example of recognizing an old friend walking down the street. The 
equivalent of this type of recognition, when talking about cultural identity, 
would be the recognition of one‟s belonging to an existing cultural group by 
identifying a specific feature shared by members of that group. Second type 
of recognition is constructivist recognition where the act of recognition itself 
represents an act of forming one‟s identity. The example Markell gives is 
when, at a business meeting, a chairperson recognizes a speaker: chairperson 
is not “merely manifesting her awareness of a status that already really 
exists… the privilege of speaking is itself a product of the chairperson‟s 
institutionally authorized act of recognition” (Markell, 2003: 40). In the realm 
of culture, this would mean that the process of public recognition (or 
misrecognition) of a specific group leads to formation or reformulation of that 
group‟s collective identity.  
My argument is that Gilbert‟s questioning of the validity of political 
claims based on preservation of cultural identity in an attack with a dull 
blade when it comes to constructivist understanding of culture and acts of 
constructivist recognition. Although it might be often the case that 
representatives of both minority and majority groups arguing for the 
preservation of their culture fall into Herderian trap, it would be wrong to 
presume, as Gilbert seems to do, that politics of cultural identity inevitable 
rely on Herderian model. I believe that this presumption of Gilbert‟s leads 
him to misinterpret two prominent authors that played pivotal roles in 
contemporary debates on issues of national and cultural identity, 
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multiculturalism and politics of collective recognition - Isaiah Berlin and 
Charles Taylor - as being Herder‟s heirs. It is true that both of these authors 
have been greatly influences by Herder, but neither of them are advocates of 
the Herderian model as described above. At the beginning of the third 
chapter of his book, Gilbert gives us an extensive quote from Isaiah Berlin 
that clearly puts Berlin in Herderian camp (Gilbert, 2010: 39-40). The 
problem is that this quote does not, as Gilbert suggests, represent Berlin‟s 
own position, but rather a description of the process of birth of aggressive 
nationalism of which Berlin himself was very critical. The major difference 
between Herder and Berlin is that when Herder talks about a universal need 
to belong to a cultural group he takes an essentialist view of belonging to a 
group in which one was born and raised as the only authentic mode of 
existence. Berlin argues that sort of thinking is in the root of aggressive 
nationalist movements in the 20th century. For him the need to belong 
manifests itself in the fact that it is not possible to be completely outside all 
existing cultures, but we can still live authentic lives if we change the culture 
we belong to or, more likely, if our personal cultural identity is determined by 
cultural elements of several different groups (Berlin himself, as a Russian Jew 
born in Riga who spent most of his career in British intellectual circles, is the 
best example of this). This is why we should think of Berlin not as a 
Herderian/essentialist, but as a constructivist when discussing the nature of 
cultural identity. 
With Charles Taylor, thinks are a bit more complicated: Patchen Markell 
is, I believe, right when he argues that Taylor has both an essentialist and a 
constructivist notions of culture and recognition, but Taylor‟s emphasis in his 
seminal essay “The Politics of Recognition” on the important role that the 
dialog between the cultures plays in forming of cultural identities suggests he 
refuses to see cultures as necessarily given, closed or authentic. If Taylor is 
Herder‟s heir, as Gilbert, claims, he is a skeptical heir with a strong 
constructivist bent because a consistent Herderian could never argue as 
Taylor does that “we define our identity always in dialogue with, sometimes 
in struggle against, the things our significant others want to see in us” 
(Taylor, 1994: 32-33). Gilbert does acknowledge that Taylor‟s account of 
identity is more complex then Herder‟s, but argues that Taylor‟s tendency to 
talk both about “self-definition” of identity and identity as a matter of 
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discovery is an “unstable combination” (Gilbert, 2010: 43). However, unlike 
other critics of Taylor relying on a similar line of argument – such as Markell, 
Anthony Appiah (1994) or Sasja Tempelman (1999) – Gilbert‟s goal is not 
only to suggest that advocates of multiculturalism should avoid using 
Herderian arguments or arguments that rest on some kind of mixture of 
Herderian and constructivist approach, but that we should abandon the 
whole project of multiculturalism as philosophically incoherent.  
 
  
3. Three models of dealing with cultural difference 
 
More importantly then determining if certain political theorists fall into 
Herderian camp or not is too try and see what is an actual background behind 
the claims based on cultural identity in contemporary political discourse. This 
gives us an opportunity to see how a constructivist approach to defining 
cultural identity can translate into valid political claims. Multiculturalism 
(and, more broadly, identity politics) is a theoretical model designed to deal 
with a problem of difference within a political community. As such, it was 
built on the ashes of two previous models that addressed the same issue: the 
model of assimilation and the model of neutrality. The inadequacy of these 
two models gave rise to identity politics.  
A historical example of the politics of assimilation is “Edict Concerning 
the Civic Condition of the Jews in Prussian State” from 1812 granting civic 
rights to Prussian Jews which they were previously deprived of. The list of 
these rights included “the right to obtain academic posts and local public 
offices (though the question of service in other public offices was deferred); 
the right to practice previously restricted crafts and trades; the freedom from 
special taxes; the liberty to pass on property to all their children (not just the 
first and second sons); the freedom to marry and divorce without special 
permission; and freedom of residence in the cities and the countryside” 
(Markell, 2003: 132). Emancipation of the Jews, however, came at the price. 
For them to be able to enjoy “the same civic rights and freedoms as the 
Christians” they had to be ready to sacrifice parts of their Jewish identity. 
Equal right were granted only to those ready to adopt Western-sounding 
surnames and use of German (or some other living European) language and 
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Latin script when conducting business or attending to legal matters. Most 
importantly, the Edict deprived “rabbis and community elders of all legal 
jurisdiction and authority” and put “Jewish affairs almost entirely under 
Prussian law” in order to avoid the existence of the state within the state 
(ibid., 136). The politics of emancipation came hand in hand with politics of 
assimilation. This formula was a common stock of progressive liberal thought 
in 19th century and was advocated even by John Stuart Mill who, in his 
Considerations on Representative Government argues: “Experience proves, that 
it is possible for one nationality to merge and be absorbed by another: and 
when it was originally an inferior and more backward portion of the human 
race, the absorption is greatly to its advantage. Nobody can suppose that it is 
not more beneficial to a Breton, or a Basque of French Navarre, to be 
brought into the current of the ideas and feelings of a highly civilized and 
cultivated people – to be a member of the French nationality, admitted on 
equal terms to all privileges of French citizenship, sharing the advantages of 
French protection, and the dignity and prestige of French power – than to 
sulk on his own rocks, the half-savage relic of past times, revolving in his own 
little mental orbit, without participation or interest in the general movement 
of the world. The same remark applies to the Welshman or the Scottish 
Highlander, as members of the British nation.” (Mill, 1991: 431)  
The reason why the model of assimilation was abandoned is that it rests 
on the premise most of us find unacceptable today: the premise that there are 
cultures which are, in all their aspects, superior to some other cultures so that 
it is not only just, but even rational for members of such inferior cultures to 
want to be assimilated into a superior one.  
The second model is that of neutrality and it draws on post-Reformation 
toleration model which introduced the idea that the state should be 
indifferent to religious beliefs and practices of worship of their citizens as long 
as those practices do not directly violate the rights of other citizens and 
endanger the security of the state. In the same vein, neutrality model argues 
that the state should be neutral towards different conceptions of the good 
their citizens hold by providing the wide framework within which citizens are 
free to pursue their own understanding of the good life. This framework is 
established by granting equal rights to all citizens, irrespective of their 
gender, race, ethnicity, religion or cultural identity. Ronald Dworkin 
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summarized this position in the following way: “Government must be neutral 
in ethics in the following sense. It must not forbid or reward any private 
activity on the ground that one substantive set of ethical values, one set of 
opinions about the best way to lead a life, is superior or inferior to others.” 
(Dworkin, 1990: 228) 
The difference between this model and the model of assimilation is 
obvious: a state that respects the principle of neutrality will ensure a wide a 
realm of personal liberty for all its citizens within which they can pursue their 
conceptions of good without trying to impose any specific conception of good 
on them. This, of course, includes those conceptions of good which are, in 
most part, determined by one‟s belonging to a specific cultural group. Liberal 
neutral state does not require of its citizens to abandon their cultural beliefs 
and practices as a way of assimilating into a cultural life of the majority. The 
only legitimate ban a neutral state can impose on different cultural practices 
is when such practices directly violate the rights of other citizens.  
  The neutrality model has been criticized on many different levels (see 
Mulhall and Swift, 1992), but the main complaint from the perspective that 
interests us the most – the question of cultural identity – is that liberal state 
only wears the mask of neutrality for it is actually not neutral between 
different conceptions of good or different cultures in a way that Dworkin 
suggests. There are two points from which we can question the neutrality 
ideal of a liberal state in the context of cultural recognition debate. First, 
there is an issue of different burdens that specific laws and public policies put 
on members of different cultural groups. The example often used in the 
multiculturalism literature is that of Sikhs who are unable to comply with a 
law that instructs all motorbike drivers to wear crash helmets without 
violating a duty of wearing turbans as prescribed by their own religion. 
Second point is more dramatic because it doesn‟t only question the culturally 
non-neutral consequences of specific laws and policies, but argues that liberal 
state is not neutral at all because it often proscribes what their citizens can 
wear (the burqua or turban debate), how they can prepare their food (the 
debate about halal or kosher meat), how they can burry their dead (the issue 
of Hindu‟s burning their dead on funeral pyres), who they can marry (the 
issue of homosexual or polygamous marriages), when they can get days off for 
the holidays (Christmas being national holiday, unlike other religious 
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holidays), what their children must learn in schools (such as Mozert v. 
Hawkins case) and how long their education must be (the debate on Amish 
children such as Wisconsin v. Yoder), what formal languages they should use 
(the debate on bilingual schools or languages used by local governments), etc.  
This is a crucial point because often the critics of multiculturalism, such 
as Brian Barry (2001), assume that only minority groups make political 
claims on the basis of culture. But it is, in most cases, the liberal state that 
has demands towards its citizens. These demands are usually not, as in case of 
Ms. Silmi, based on invoking the preservation of majority‟s culture. Rather 
they bring into play secularism or modern science or national unity or nature 
or universal values, but from the perspective of minority groups they are not 
any less culturally embedded then their own demands. As Charles Taylor put 
it: “liberalism is also a fighting creed” (Taylor, 1994: 62). This suggests that 
constructivist model of describing how cultural identities are formed and 
formulated is much more convincing then the Herderian model that 
disregards the dynamic process in large part defined by the demands that 
different groups have towards each other. Wearing of burqua can provoke the 
debate of what it means to be French, just as banning of such practice can 
lead Muslim women to embrace burqua as an important part of their identity.  
 
 
4. Cultural Identity and Political Ethics Revisited 
 
What are the implications of this for Gilbert‟s line of argument? Gilbert‟s own 
understanding of cultural identity seems to fall into a constructivist camp 
which becomes clear when he concludes, agreeing with Chandran Kukathas, 
that cultural identity is “inescapably political” (Gilbert, 2010: 59). In chapter 
four he introduces Berlin‟s metaphors (filtered by David Miller) of crooked 
timber and bent twig to illustrate two different approaches to understanding 
cultural identity. Crooked timber approach corresponds to Herderian-
essentialist view where cultural identity is given and every individual is 
already born into clearly formed and unique culture which, in large part, will 
determine his future actions. The bent twig approach follows the 
constructivist view by suggesting that person‟s cultural identity is mainly 
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formed as a response to how others perceive it and therefore, it is much more 
hybrid and dynamic then a true Herderian would allow.  
Gilbert, I believe, is right in rejecting the crooked timber approach and 
embracing a bent twig theory as a much more plausible account on how 
cultural identities are actually formed. As the metaphor of bent twig – which 
when released, lashes back - suggests, cultural groups primarily formulate 
their political claims as a response to a perceived threat to a specific aspect of 
their culture. It is, as I‟ve mentioned before, a dynamic and constructive 
process because collective cultural identities emerge from such political 
responses to existing or assumed threats. Gilbert himself advocates this 
argument when, in chapter four of his book, he talks about different types of 
perceived threats to group‟s cultural self-understanding and effect these 
threats might have on such self-understanding. He is at his best when he 
gives a detailed account of how political claims of culture emerge and offers a 
classification of the “twig shapes in terms of the sort of wind that bends 
them… not in the terms of the sort of tree on which they grow” (ibid., 69). 
This informative “bent twig typology” of cultural identities allows him to 
show that “there is no unitary notion of cultural… identity” but only that 
there are different “responses to different sort of circumstances that go by the 
same name only because they are used in a similar way politically, not 
because they express some deep feature that all those who claim a cultural 
identity possess” (ibid., 70). Types of identity Gilbert talk about are: identity 
as standing, identity as centre, identity as face, identity as affiliation, identity 
as home, identity as mission and identity as label. What is common to all 
these different types of identity is that there is nothing Herderian or 
essentialist about them because they are “essentially political concepts 
deployed to support political claims” (ibid., 92).  
I want to argue that Gilbert is right when he concludes that, as far as 
collective cultural identity goes, “what cultural content as identity has – 
value, language, history or whatever – is determined by purely political 
considerations and these are those that weight with prospective groups 
members” (ibid., 64). However, I disagree with the conclusion he draws from 
this: “there seems to be no sound ethical grounding for any particular sort of 
cultural identity” (ibid.). It might be true that “no particular cultural 
component of identity seems ethically privileged” (ibid.) if we look at each of 
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these components separately, but once we take political context into an 
equation, these components can gain strong “ethical grounding”. Let me 
explain what I mean by political context and strong ethical grounding. Take 
an example of, what Amy Gutmann called, ascriptive markers (Gutmann, 
2003) such as color of one‟s skin or one‟s sexual orientation. Taken by 
themselves, they don‟t have any kind of ethical grounding: a person would 
not be able to make any kind of coherent ethical claims based solely on the 
fact that the color of her skin is black or that she is a homosexual. However, 
once such a person becomes discriminated against due to her race or sexual 
orientation, these markers become a valid basis for both moral and political 
claims. This is exactly what bent twig theory suggests: a fact that a person is 
under threat because of some feature of her personal identity gives moral 
weight to her demand that her identity receives a public recognition. Gilbert, 
it seems, does not follow up on this suggestion.  
He uses “bent twig typology” to show us that there is nothing 
Herderian/essentialist about collective cultural identity, but that it is, just 
like one‟s national identity, a mere political construct. This explains the “the 
tactics of identity-group activist… they seek to make a certain identity 
important to its prospective members so that they rally to the cause. They 
may sometimes do so by trying to demonstrate that it is already important 
for them, when their consequent self-identification will have a character of 
discovery” (Gilbert, 2010: 63). I agree with this part, but I disagree with 
Gilbert that what follows from this is that, if we accept the constructivist 
view of cultural identity, invoking cultural identity in political debates 
becomes deeply incoherent. What makes the claims of culture in politics 
valid? It seems that for Gilbert validity of such claims rests on the validity of 
essentialist understanding of the nature of cultural identity. Then, if our goal 
is to discredit the very idea of collective cultural identity, it would be enough, 
as Gilbert successfully does, to show that essentialist model is false by 
demonstrating that the constructivist model offers a much more convincing 
take on the nature of collective cultural identity. I think that Gilbert‟s 
argument has a much more limited reach: it shows that tactics of identity-
groups activist that rely on essentialist understanding of culture is 
misleading, but it has little to say to those activist (and theorists) that use 
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cultural claims that rely on constructivist, rather then essentialist 
understanding of cultural identity.  
I will try to make my case stronger by going back to Gilbert‟s two core 
arguments against the politics of identity. I want to argue that constructivist 
model explains why making political claims on the basis of culture makes 
sense a) even if one‟s cultural group is not the same as one‟s community, b) 
cultural features of a group are not all encompassing or are too wide and c) 
the cultural features in question have no deep character, but are rather mere 
surface features. When it comes to a) the central question is: is it a necessary 
condition that membership of person‟s cultural group be identically to that of 
person‟s cultural community for cultural identity claims to be valid? It does if 
we insist on Herderian/essentialist view of culture. On the other hand, the 
constructivist model and bent twig theory allows us to look at things 
differently: collective demands that invoke the preservation of culture do not 
have to come from those who are members of the same community (in a way 
that Gilbert uses the term) if those who share certain cultural features start 
perceiving themselves as being under threat. Again, we can use the example 
of ascriptive markers: a black or a gay person can never be a member of all-
encompassing black or gay community because there are no such all-
encompassing communities. Nevertheless, the fact that black people or 
homosexuals can point to a long history of abuse and discrimination against 
them, makes it valid for them to talk about collective group identity and for 
their representatives or spokespersons to make political claims in the name of 
such a group. For such claims to be coherent, it is not necessary that all 
blacks or homosexuals experienced these abuses or discriminations, nor is it 
necessary that all of them give direct consent or even agree with activists who 
speak in their name. Of course, it is possible to say, as more moderate black in 
the US said about Malcolm X or more radical blacks said about Martin 
Luther King, that the solutions these activists are advocate are not their 
solutions. This does not, however, mean that political claims that invoke 
collective black identity are, from ethical point of view, incoherent or 
dubious. The same line of argument can be applied to collective cultural 
identity. If, for example, a liberal state wants to ban the use of kosher meat on 
the basis of unnecessary cruelty to animals and Jewish religious leaders 
respond that such a ban is endangering Jewish cultural tradition, this 
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response can be considered valid, although it is obvious that they speak in the 
name of a collective group which is not in any way a close-knit community, 
i.e. “a group of people actually leading a common life”.  
What about b) when activists defend cultural features or practices as 
important elements of their group‟s identity, although these features and 
practices are not shared by all the members of that group? Let us again use 
the example of ban on kosher meat. Not all Jewish people find it necessary to 
eat kosher meat and therefore do not think that it is in any way a relevant 
part of their Jewish identity. Nevertheless, rabbis could still coherently argue 
that this ban is endangering Jewish cultural identity, even if they themselves 
accept that one can be a Jew without eating only kosher food. This, of course, 
does not imply that their demands have to be accepted, because the wider 
society or the state legislature can still rank the ban on animal cruelty higher 
then respect of cultural practice of a specific group. All it implies is that such 
demands are not a priori unfounded.  
Finally, there is c) an issue if, as Gilbert argues, “a cultural identity must 
be theorized as something deep for the ethical demand to carry over to it”. 
There are two possible responses to this argument. First, many of cultural 
identity claims in multicultural discourse do actually have a deep character: if 
a person believes that wearing a burqua is a part of her duty toward God, 
rather then just a piece of clothing that distinguishes her from the non-
believers or more moderate Muslims, then we can take this feature is not just 
a surface, but a deep part of her identity. Second, and more important from 
constructivist and bent theory approach, even if something is nothing more 
then a surface part of someone‟s cultural identity, it can still offer a basis for a 
valid ethical demand. When a liberal state bans or puts restrictions on certain 
cultural practices of minorities it would seem deeply unjust if the only way a 
minority members could try to resist such ban or restrictions is if they can 
prove that practices in question are a deep part of their cultural identity. 
Liberal principles of justice suggest that a burden of arguing why a certain 
practice should be regulated by the state falls on the shoulders of the state 
itself. Otherwise, the state could legitimately ban any practice that, for the 
individuals involved in such a practice, has nothing more then just a surface 
meaning.  
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In conclusion, rather then abandoning the whole idea of using cultural 
identity as a coherent concept in our political discourse, which is what Gilbert 
advocates, I would suggest that political philosophers should put their efforts 
in providing a normative framework which would allow us to determine 
which political claims based on culture should be taken seriously and which 
ones should be dismissed. This paper only hints at how we could go about 
doing this – by identifying if the threat to cultural identity of a group is real 
or fabricated, by rejecting Herderian/essentialist as a valid basis for political 
claims, by accepting the constructivist and ever changing nature of collective 
identities, by acknowledging that we are better of if some cultural practices, 
even when they are an important part of one‟s culture, be abandoned, by 
recognizing that sometimes we have to make a tragic choice between valid 
competing political claims of different cultural groups, by not equating 
cultural groups with cultural communities – because its main goal was to 
argue, pace Gilbert, that the idea of invoking collective cultural identity in 
politics become meaningful once we start thinking about cultural identity in a 
constructivist way as an act of political response.  
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